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1. Executive Summary
The Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect held a two-day workshop
entitled ‘Genocide and Mass Atrocities in the Asia-Pacific: Legacies and Prevention’
on 21-22 March at the University of Queensland. Attendees participated in a range
of panels on key issues central to the workshop theme, including the legacies of
mass violence, transitional justice, mass atrocity prevention, and specific regional
issues. The purpose of the workshop was to initiate serious scholarly examination of
a variety of topics surrounding the legacies and the prevention of genocide and mass
atrocities in the Asia-Pacific region. The workshop was structured around four key
areas of enquiry:


The legacy of mass violence in Indonesia and East Timor



Transitional Justice after mass atrocities



Early warning and prevention of genocide and mass atrocities in the AsiaPacific



The United Nations, sovereignty and international intervention in mass
atrocity crimes

The keynote speaker for the workshop was Professor Alex Hinton, Executive
Director, Center for the Study of Genocide, Conflict Resolution and Human Rights,
Professor of Anthropology and Global Affairs, Rutgers University (New Jersey). In
conjunction with the workshop was the launch of the exhibition Lessons from
Rwanda: The United Nations and the Prevention of Genocide. This exhibition, from
the United Nations Department of Public Information, was on display for the first
time in Australia at The University of Queensland.
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2. Introduction
The twentieth century has been labelled the ‘century of genocide’. According to
some estimates, more than 250 million civilians were victims of genocide and mass
atrocities during this period. The Asia-Pacific region has not been immune.
Genocide and mass atrocities have occurred in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in
1971, Indonesia (1965-66), Cambodia (1975-79) and East Timor (1975-1999). At the
opening of the twenty-first century, efforts to halt this massive loss of innocent life
culminated in the emergence and acceptance of the ‘responsibility to protect’
principle in international discourse. More effort than ever before is being
channelled towards preventing mass atrocities.
It is perhaps surprising therefore, that there have been very few attempts to
examine this issue at the regional level. Regional influences can be of substantial
impact in both dealing with the legacies of past atrocities and in endeavours to
prevent future instances of genocide or mass atrocities. In the Asia-Pacific in
particular, issues surrounding sovereignty and non-intervention, the dearth of
capacity and mandate amongst regional organisations and the wide variance in
approaches to governance provide a unique constellation of challenges. Many
nations in the region are comprised of bipolar or multiethnic populations, with the
associated challenges of maintaining national cohesion and working to avoid or limit
ethnic cleavages. Empirically, those struggling with the legacy of past genocides are
also at increased risk of future events – further compounding the struggle to rebuild.
This workshop was organised to bring a specific Asia-Pacific focus to the field of
genocide prevention. It was the first workshop dedicated to exploring the legacies of
past genocides and mass atrocities in the Asia-Pacific and examining genocide
prevention from this specifically regional perspective. The workshop consisted of
the following five panel discussions:
Panel One: Mass Violence in Indonesia and East Timor
Panel Two: Opportunities and Challenges for Mass Atrocity Prevention in the
Asia-Pacific
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Panel Three: Transnational Justice After Mass Atrocity
Panel Four: Early Warning and Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities
Panel Five: The United Nations, Sovereignty and International Intervention in
Mass Atrocity Crimes
As part of the workshop, an Exhibition Opening, entitled Lessons from Rwanda: The
United Nations and the Prevention of Genocide and a Public Lecture, entitled The
Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A View from Critical Transitional Justice Studies were held.
The workshop concluded with a Roundtable, which invited participants to reflect on
the key themes of the event and to identify issues for future consideration. The
following report presents the topics and analysis from each panel, in addition to the
public lecture and roundtable.
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3. Panel One: Mass Violence in Indonesia
and East Timor
East Timor: The Politics of Starvation
Clinton Fernandes
About the Presenter:
Associate Professor Clinton Fernandes is a political scientist at UNSW@ADFA. His
most recent publication is The Independence of East Timor: Multidimensional
perspectives – Occupation, Resistance and International Political Activism (2011).
Abstract:
Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975 and occupied it for 24 years. During that time,
East Timor suffered perhaps the largest loss of life relative to total population since
the Holocaust. The majority of deaths occurred between 1977 and 1979 as a result
of a widespread famine caused by the Indonesian military’s operations. This paper
demonstrates that early warning of the famine was available but consistently
ignored by Indonesia and by a number of Western governments. For Indonesia, the
military objective of destroying the resistance overrode all other considerations. For
Western governments, the maintenance of good relations with the Suharto regime
took priority. They deliberately refrained from proposing humanitarian aid until they
received the go-ahead from the Indonesian military. Humanitarian aid finally arrived
in sufficient quantities after pressure generated by a relatively small number of
activists, primarily in the USA, Australia and Britain. The efforts of these activists not
only ended the famine, they also led to the creation of influential, long-term support
for East Timor’s independence among members of the US Congress and large media
organizations.
About the presentation:
The first presenter in this panel was Associate Professor Clinton Fernandes from the
School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of New South Wales
whose paper was titled ‘East Timor: The Politics of Starvation’. Associate Professor
Fernandes began his presentation by explaining the context in which the mass
atrocities in East Timor took place. For this purpose, he explained that Indonesia
invaded East Timor in 1975 and occupied it for 24 years. The invasion was resisted by
force of arms. He noted that East Timor’s Commission for Reception, Truth and
Legacies and Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities in the Asia-Pacific: A Workshop Report
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Reconciliation concluded that the minimum-bound for the number of conflictrelated deaths was 102,800 (+/- 12,000), and the upper bound may have been as
high as 183,000. He further noted that Sarah Staveteig, a demographer at the
University of California – Berkeley, applied standard demographic methods of
indirect estimation and found that 204,000 was a conservative upper-bound
estimate on excess mortality. This was out of a starting population 648,000.
However, Associate Professor Fernandes noted that, unlike the Holocaust, the
situation in East Timor was not classified as a genocide due to the fact that the
intentions of the Indonesian military were to suppress the resistance movement in
East Timor, and not to destroy either in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group as such. Killings and mass violence committed for such political
objectives are not covered under the UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948).
As noted by Associate Professor Fernandes, during this occupation of East Timor by
Indonesian forces, the military objective of destroying the resistance overrode all
other considerations. He explained that this was particularly evident during the
period 1977 – 1979, which saw an extremely large loss of life in East Timor as a result
of the widespread famine that was caused by the Indonesian military’s
determination to suppress the resistance movement. He asserted that only the
Indonesian Red Cross, which was controlled by the Indonesian government, was
given access to the country for most of this period. However, Associate Professor
Fernandes argued that even in this instance, the food aid supplied by the Indonesian
Red Cross failed to alleviate the widespread hunger that the famine had caused in
East Timor, as this food aid was sold at significantly inflated prices by the Indonesian
military to the East Timorese public for the purpose of securing profits and greater
material power.
According to Associate Professor Fernandes, a number of Western governments had
received early warnings of the famine, but these warnings were consistently ignored.
He asserted that the reason for this was the high priority that these governments
gave to preserving good relations with the Suharto regime. In explaining this,
Associate Professor Fernandes highlighted that even within the United Nations, only
four Western states (Cyprus, Greece, Iceland and Portugal) supported East Timor in
the General Assembly from 1976 till 1982, when the matter was delegated to the UN
Secretary-General. Only one-third of the UN’s member states, mostly Third World or
socialist, supported East Timor in the General Assembly. The United States, the
United Kingdom and France acknowledged that East Timor had the right to selfdetermination but did not support any General Assembly resolutions on the issue
between 1975 and 1982. Their actions in the Security Council shielded Indonesia
from international reaction. Fernandes explained that China and the Soviet Union
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supported Security Council resolutions and General Assembly resolutions on the
issue between 1975 and 1982 (with the exception of 1979 for China).
According to Associate Professor Fernandes, while it was legal to listen to Timorese
radio broadcasts in Australia, it was illegal to broadcast out of Australia without a
licence. Fernandes explained how activists broke the law by setting up a clandestine
radio broadcasting station. He argued that many scholars within Australia aligned
their research priorities to fit in with the diplomatic position of the Indonesian
government, staying clear of East Timor or actively defending the Indonesian
occupation. This meant that even within academic circles, there was little mention of
the situation in East Timor during this period.
One of the main consequences of such responses by Western governments was that
the general public within most Western states had very little knowledge of the dire
situation in East Timor. Furthermore, he also noted that much needed humanitarian
aid was not supplied. However, Associate Professor Fernandes asserted that a key
turning point did arrive with the emergence of a relatively small number of activists,
primarily in the United States, Britain and Australia. These groups were vital in
generating public awareness about the situation in East Timor and ending the famine
in the country. He also emphasized that the work of these activists had other far
reaching consequences. For example, in the United States, these activists attracted
the support of a leading scholar in the field of international relations, Benedict
Anderson, which was a significant development for the movement as it legitimised
the East Timorese cause. Professor Noam Chomsky, the pre-eminent linguist and
political activist, worked alongside US activist, Arnold Kohen, to create a structure of
legitimacy for the East Timorese cause. Furthermore, Associate Professor Fernandes
noted that as a result of this structure of legitimacy, the New York Times, which had
earlier reported that the actual death toll was not as high as claimed by activists,
completely changed their position and became an eminent supporter of the cause.
Associate Professor Fernandes also highlighted that the work by the activists created
pressure for the US Congress to play a more active role in the situation in East Timor,
and rebutted earlier statements released by Western governments that had
downplayed the situation in East Timor.
The presentation concluded that if it had not been for the efforts of the activists,
little would have been done by the Western governments, which were consumed by
their own priorities, in securing independence for East Timor from Indonesia.
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An Ongoing Legacy of Atrocity: Torture and the Indonesian State
Annie Pohlman
About the Presenter:
Annie Pohlman is Program Leader for the Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia
at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Her primary research
interests include the 1965-66 Indonesian killings, and the experiences of women
victims of torture in Indonesia.
Abstract:
Twelve years after the end of the New Order regime (1966-1998) in Indonesia, the
promise of reform has fallen short for the regime’s many victims of gross human
rights abuses. The very few trials of serious offenders have been farcical, the reforms
put in place to check the power of the military and police lack strength and political
will, and attempts to set up a national truth and reconciliation commission have
failed. The continuing lack of redress for past serious violations has reinforced the
entrenched culture of impunity in Indonesia, particularly for members of the security
sector. One of the clearest examples of this relationship between past impunity and
continuing atrocities in Indonesia is the use of torture by State and co-opted agents.
Examining the use of torture by the Indonesian state over the past fifty years
highlights the cyclical relationship between ongoing impunity for past incidents of
serious abuses, the institutionalization of this abuse in the security sector, and the
urgent need for redress and reform. To do this, this presentation briefly charts the
use of torture during some of the major cases of systemic and severe human rights
abuse during the New Order. It then describes evidence of the continuing use of
torture by State agents over the past decade, highlighting a number of recent cases,
and concludes by arguing for a number of avenues for redress and reform aimed at
removing torture as a tool of state policy in Indonesia.
About the Presentation:
In introducing her paper, Ms. Pohlman acknowledged that in the twelve years since
the fall of the Suharto regime, there have been some changes for the better in terms
of human rights within the country. These include greater civil liberties, press
freedoms and constitutional amendments. Despite these improvements, Ms.
Pohlman asserted that the promise of democratisation has fallen short, and has
often been determined by power sharing deals amongst fragmented elites, at the
expense of democratic quality and accountability. She also noted that attempts at
transitional justice measures in Indonesia have produced very little justice, with very
few offenders of human rights during Suharto’s regime being tried, and those trials
that have been conducted being completely farcical. In addition to this, Ms. Pohlman
highlighted that the reforms put in place to check the power of the military and
police lack strength and political will, and attempts to set up a national truth and
Legacies and Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities in the Asia-Pacific: A Workshop Report
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reconciliation commission have yet to succeed. Such failures at transitional justice
have reinforced an already entrenched culture of impunity in Indonesia, particularly
among members of the security sector.
In order to analyse the strong link between impunity for past atrocities and their
continuation today in democratizing Indonesia, Ms Pohlman provided the example
of the use of torture by state and co-opted forces in Indonesia. She argued that
while the use of torture by state agents in Indonesia was evident both under the
colonial government and the Sukarno regime, the mass violence that brought the
New Order to power in 1966 was a major contributor to the institutionalisation of
torture as routinised practice. It was noted that from 1965 until the late 1960s, the
army carried out a genocidal campaign against its major political rivals. During this
period, through operational use, large portions of the security sector and their coopted civilian militias became increasingly more refined at the tools, tactics and
strategies for questioning and harming victims. Ms Pohlman stated that this, in turn,
played a vital role in the training and institutionalisation of torture as a form and
means of policy within the security sector.
Ms Pohlman asserted that there was great hope that such human rights abuses
would be abolished after the fall of the Suharto regime and in the early years of the
Reform. However, this has not been the case. She provided the example of the
incident of torture of two Papupan men, Tunaliwor Kiwo and Telangga Gire, in May
2010 by Indonesian soldiers. It was noted that this was a unique case for three main
reasons. Firstly, it attracted widespread international attention and outrage due to
the fact that a video of these two men being tortured was uploaded onto the
Internet. Furthermore, as a result of the widespread international outrage that this
video sparked off, the military had to acknowledge that torture had taken place, and
given that the perpetrators in the video were all wearing military uniforms, that
soldiers had clearly been the perpetrators of the torture. Another way in which this
case was unique is that due to further international pressure, a trial of these soldiers
was held in January 2011, with three of the soldiers involved being sentenced to 8 –
10 months imprisonment. However, Ms Pohlman observed that these soldiers have
not been discharged from the military, and can return to service at the end of their
sentence.
According to Ms Pohlman, the reasons for the continued violence in Indonesia are
threefold. The first reason is the routinisation and eventual normalisation of violence
as means of work for portions of the military and police. Second, is the failure to set
up competent and accountable bodies and mechanisms to prevent and investigate
incidents of torture. Ms Pohlman stated this is clearly seen by the relationship
between the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) and the Attorney
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General’s Office. In 1999 and 2000, the mandate of the Komnas HAM was expanded
to allow it to investigate cases of gross abuses, to prepare independent reports, and
to make recommendations for prosecutions to the attorney general and even for a
human rights court to be set up. While it can then be assumed that the case should
then proceed to the Attorney General’s Office for investigation and sentencing, this
has been far from the reality. Recommendations issued by Komnas HAM have
continued to be ignored by the Attorney General, and despite overwhelming
evidence of abuse, many cases have simply gone nowhere and perpetrators have
been left unpunished.
The third reason Ms Pohlman provided for the continued violence in Indonesia is
that there seems to be a somewhat changed demographic amongst victims, at least
in terms of cases reported. In expanding on this, she noted that there has been an
increase in ‘recreational torture’ amongst the police against the socially vulnerable
or marginalised in society. While she did note that these people have always been
harassed and abused by the police, she highlighted that the number of cases
reported has increased. However, she explained that this increase in reported
abuses may be due to the improved ability of NGOs to intervene or at least report on
these cases. Nevertheless, Ms Pohlman asserted that what can be extracted from
this is that when torture becomes such an acceptable practice against perceived
internal enemies, it can easily be carried out against anyone else who is seen as an
enemy, especially when there is a lack of adequate mechanisms to hold perpetrators
accountable.

Panel One Question and Answer
Following the presentations by Associate Professor Clinton Fernandes and Ms Annie
Pohlman, the floor was open to questions from workshop participants. The following
section summarises the questions and answers.
Q1: The first questioned asked if the patriarchal nature of Indonesian society may be
a possible reason for the widespread violence that was perpetrated against women
during the New Order, and which still continues today.
In response, Ms Pohlman remarked that patriarchy was, and continues to be, a
significant factor contributing to the violence against women in Indonesia. During
the New Order, the Suharto regime developed fictitious stories about the
unorthodox behaviour of ‘Communist women’ in order to demonize them, and thus,
encouraged their violent suppression by the Indonesian military. She also noted that
the growing independence of Indonesian women has been perceived as an imminent
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threat to the long established patriarchal nature of Indonesian society and hence,
sexual violence has been used to re-establish this balance.
Q2: The second question asked for more clarification about the steps that have been
taken at the local level in Indonesia to challenge this culture of impunity in
Indonesia.
In response, Ms Pohlman noted that since 1998, which saw the fall of the Suharto
regime, there has been an explosion of NGOs in Indonesia. By using the discourse of
being victims, they have been relatively successful in getting both funding and
sympathy. However, she emphasized there is a significant disconnect between NGOs
working at a local level and the government, due to a lack of political will by the
state.
Associate Professor Clinton Fernandes added to this, by highlighting that while the
tactic of protest has been legitimised following the fall of Suharto and the
subsequent relative democratisation process that has ensued, international
dynamics have completely out-manoeuvred local NGOs. The reason for this is that
the international community, particularly Western states such as Australia, have
been very involved in training the Indonesian military. However, Associate Professor
Fernandes argued that such training has not resulted in an improvement in the
human rights records of these former perpetrators; rather, it has merely increased
their chances of getting promoted. Hence, he proposed that one way that the
international community can assist these local level NGOs to challenge the culture of
impunity in Indonesia is by providing publicity and education to local activists, while
denying training to members of the Indonesian military.
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4. Panel Two: Opportunities and Challenges
for Mass Atrocity Prevention in the AsiaPacific
Mediation in the Asia-Pacific: Constraints and Challenges
Dale Bagshaw
About the Presenter:
Associate Professor Dale Bagshaw is Adjunct Associate Professor in the School of
Psychology, Social Work and Social Policy at the University of South Australia.
Associate Professor Bagshaw is the President of the Asia-Pacific Mediation Forum.
Her most recent publication is Mediation in the Asia-Pacific: Transforming Conflicts
and Building Peace (co-edited with Elisabeth Porter).
Abstract:
This paper focuses on the constraints and challenges faced by mediators who try to
build culturally fluent models of mediation that are relevant to the Asia-Pacific
context, acknowledge traditional ways of resolving conflict and also redress power
imbalances and challenge structural inequities to ensure just outcomes for all
involved. Mediation is a voluntary, cooperative process wherein an impartial
mediator controls the process and assists the parties in conflict to make their own
decisions. However, for mediation work, all relevant parties need to be willing to: be
actively involved, allow the mediator to control the process, share relevant
information and treat each other with respect. Mediation is not appropriate where
parties in conflict hold rigid, intractable views or where the power inequity between
the parties is so great that the mediator cannot redress the imbalance by using
specific techniques. In some instances, mediation can be a useful approach,
particularly in the early stages of a conflict or dispute when the mediator can assist
the parties to manage, resolve or transform the conflict by: communicating openly
with each other, identifying the factors contributing to the conflict, developing a
range of possible options or solutions and engaging in principled negotiation,
thereby preventing the conflict from escalating into violence.
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About the Presentation:
The first part of Associate Professor Bagshaw’s presentation focused on the history
of mediation in the Asia Pacific, and the role that cultural and religious factors have
played in the mediation process. Associate Professor Bagshaw noted that in the Asia
Pacific, there has been a long standing history of informal conflict resolution
involving intermediaries or third parties. She highlighted that some of these
traditional practices are quite similar to Western forms of mediation where the
parties make their own decisions, while others are more like arbitration, where a
third party makes the decisions. For example, she noted that the informal use of
intermediaries was found to be common in many indigenous cultures in the Asia
Pacific region, such as the Kon Chin among Chinese and Kampong Kutu or Penghulu
among Malays. Associate Professor Bagshaw also asserted that in many of these
traditional or cultural mediation practices, religious principles are strongly drawn on
in many of these traditional or customary mediation practices. For example, in
Islamic societies, the Holy Quran is used as a manual for resolving disputes amicably,
while the Chinese view of dispute resolution is grounded in Confucian ethical
principles.
Associate Professor Bagshaw then focused on the reasons for the increased interest
in mediation in the Asia Pacific region. The first reason she highlighted was the
inability of civil justice systems to deal with the increasing load of cases. Secondly,
she noted that scarce resources such as legal aid, the rising costs of litigation and the
need to preserve or restore ongoing relationships have all been contributing factors
to the growing role of mediation in the Asia Pacific region.
Despite the growing importance of mediation practices in the region, Associate
Professor Bagshaw emphasized that mediation may not always be appropriate. She
claimed that the situations where mediation is most likely to be successful is where
continuing relationships are important, where parties in conflict are willing to
voluntarily participate, share relevant information and allow the mediator to control
the process. It was also noted that in order for mediation to be effective, all parties
should have a roughly equal amount of power and are competent to negotiate, and
parties should be willing to compromise and not hold intractable views.
The presentation then focused on the importance of culture in mediation, and the
challenges that mediators face when working cross culturally. Associate Professor
Bagshaw drew on the work of Michelle LeBaron, who asserted that all conflicts are
culturally based. In addition to this, she asserted that culture is vital to mediation
practice due the fact that cultural values may determine the choice of mediators. For
example, while an objective and impartial mediator may be prized in some cultural
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groups or with regards to certain kinds of disputes, other cultural groups may prefer
respected and well known elders.
While culture plays a determining role in mediation practice, Associate Professor
Bagshaw stressed that mediators must be cautious of the fact that cultures are
consistently changing, and there are wide variations within cultures. In further
analysing the complex role of cultural principles in mediation, she explained that
while individualised, direct, linear, confrontational and solution oriented approaches
to conflict resolution tend to be promoted in most mainstream Western theoretical
models of mediation, this may not be suitable for other non-Western cultures. For
example, she noted that Australian indigenous communities and many other cultural
groups and individuals in the Asia Pacific tend to value more indirect communication,
holistic approaches, harmony and the preservation or restoration of relationships.
She also emphasized that mediators seeking to work across cultures must be wary of
the possible power imbalances that may exist between parties and which are based
on cultural factors. However, she noted that it may be difficult to spot power
imbalances, as they are often subtle and difficult to define. However, Associate
Professor Bagshaw argued that if mediators are not able to identify these power
imbalances, mediation may merely help to reproduce abuses of power by the
dominant party, and allow for the violation of rights of the weaker party.
Despite the importance of acknowledging cultural differences and sensitivities,
Associate Professor Bagshaw contended that there still remain strong elements of
imperialism as Western mediators and trainers try to transfer their mediation
models to other cultures as the ‘right way’ to resolve conflict. However, she argued
that this has actually constrained the ability to successfully mediate conflicts in many
cases, as it may lead a process of ‘othering’, which can legitimise violence and
construct a mythology based on inclusion and exclusion.
Nevertheless, Associate Professor Bagshow noted that mediation may prove to be a
very useful approach in solving conflicts, particularly in their early stages, when the
mediator can assist the parties to manage, resolve or transform the conflict.
However, to serve these means, she emphasized the importance for mediators to
incorporate and value differences and pluralities of identity across cultures, and
consider these issues within a framework of justice and human rights.
In her concluding remarks, Associate Professor Bagshaw stressed the need to train
culturally fluent mediators in various societies in the Asia Pacific region. She
proposed that this cultural fluency be made a compulsory part of the mainstream
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curriculum from the first year at school and a pre requisite for all people in
influential positions.

The Role of Stable Small States in the Responsibility to Protect
Charles Tay
About the Presenter:
Charles Tay is currently an intern at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to
Protect. His research on the role of stable small states in promoting the
responsibility to protect will shortly be published as a Centre Working Paper.
Abstract:
Though much contemporary scholarship has accumulated on the means with which
the responsibility to protect can be translated from rhetoric to practice, opinion is
scarce on the roles particular groups of state actors can play in furthering this
agenda. This paper argues that there is a distinct category of small states with clear
capacity to implement the responsibility to protect, and proposes that this category
be identified by the fresh term – ‘stable small states’.
Definitional issues
surrounding stable small states are considered, along with why it is in the interests of
stable small states to play a proactive role in promoting the responsibility to protect,
and particularly its preventive component. Drawing on case studies from around the
world, the paper advocates a range of strategies that are appropriate for stable small
states to promote the responsibility to protect. Through the adroit usage of these
strategies, stable small states can practically transcend their conventional
limitations, raise their impact on the global stage, and make a meaningful
contribution to mass atrocity prevention.
About the Presentation:
Mr Tay began his presentation by identifying the main benefits for greater stable
small state involvement in the Responsibility to Protect. Mr Tay noted the defining
feature of stable small states is that they rank above the 75th percentile for political
stability and absence of violence in the World Bank’s governance indicators, and
have a population under ten million. In this sense, the two important
characterisations of small states are size and stability. According to Mr Tay, by
setting an upper limit for small state populations at 10 million, it includes a fair
number of potential R2P state actors while excluding traditional R2P proponents like
Canada and the UK. Stability is important because it reduces the chances of these
states being potential subjects of the R2P themselves.
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For these reasons, Mr Tay asserted that they provide significant humanitarian
benefits and can advance the role of R2P as a moral appeal. Furthermore, he noted
that stable small states could provide immense strategic benefits. Firstly, it was
noted that these states are often considered politically neutral. Moreover, stable
small states make up 24 percent of the world’s states. Due to their sheer number,
Mr, Tay noted that they enjoy favourably disproportionate voting capacities in
international and transnational organisations.
Following this, Mr Tay proposed four strategies through which stable small states
can play an influential role in the Responsibility to Protect. The first strategy he
highlighted was preventive diplomacy, which remains at the heart of the R2P.
According to Mr Tay, stable small states are ideal for preventive diplomacy due to
their traits of impartiality, credibility, political neutrality and policy consistency. In
support of this argument, he provided the example of the role that Switzerland’s
Henry Durant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue played in bringing about peace in
Aceh in 2000.
The second strategy proposed for stable small state involvement within the R2P was
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Mr Tay asserted that this could be brought
about through several techniques. For example, stable small states could facilitate
preventive mediation within crisis areas. Moreover, these stable small states can
expand their domestic ADR institution capacities to encompass transnational conflict
resolution. Finally, it was asserted that stable small states could commission
individual expert mediators and arbitrators to facilitate preventive negotiations. In
order to showcase the potential of stable small states, Mr Tay highlighted the
instrumental role that Norway played in the signing of the Oslo Accords between
Israel and the PLO between 1992 – 1993.
Mr Tay also noted that a third way in which stable small states could play a greater
role in the R2P is to use their large numbers to influence the decisions of the Security
Council. For example, he highlighted that stable small states could influence
resolutions from being vetoed through group formation and coalition management.
Within this context, Mr Tay noted that even an abstention would suffice, as it was
evident in Security Council Resolution 1593, which relates to the referral of the
situation in Darfur to the ICC, and more recently, in Security Council Resolution 1973
regarding the establishment of a no fly zone in Libya. He also highlighted that stable
small states could further sway the decisions of the Security Council by leveraging
their influence on a multinational bloc of nations, such as the G77, the 3G or the Non
Aligned Movement.
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The fourth strategy that Mr Tay proposed through which stable small states could
play a greater role in the R2P was through exporting good governance. According to
Mr Tay, this is essential as good governance mitigates the preconditions of genocides
and mass atrocities. He then highlighted some key aspects of good governance,
which include legal system robustness, security sector reform, and corruption
management. Mr Tay argued that Singapore is a key example of how stable small
states can export good governance. Through the Singapore Cooperation Programme,
it provides an array of technical assistance to developing countries and training at a
low cost. This includes services such public housing, public security and public
management.
Finally, Mr Tay highlighted that stable small states could play a greater role in the
R2P through norm advocacy in the United Nations and regional organisations. One of
the main ways through which this could be done is through framing. Mr Tay noted
that this was evident in the 2009 General Assembly debates on the R2P, where Qatar
appealed to the moral obligations felt by states, by arguing that welfare and security
of individuals should be considered above politico-economic agendas. Furthermore,
Mr Tay argued that stable small states could carry out norm advocacy by using any
opportunities they may receive to head regional or transnational organisations.
In his concluding statements, Mr Tay noted that stable small states should be
provided an opportunity to play a greater role in the R2P as the success of this
doctrine depends on international commitment and collaboration. Furthermore, he
suggested that unlike certain other states, stable small states can transcend political
limitations, and make not only rhetorical, but actual changes.
Panel Two Questions and Answers
Following the presentations by the two presenters, the floor was open to questions
from workshop participants. The following section summarises the questions and
answers.
Q1. The first question was regarding a perceived disconnection with the beginning of
Associate Professor Bagshaw’s presentation, which dealt with the importance of
acknowledging the role of culture in mediation practice, and the end of the
presentation, which highlighted the prospects that mediation provided for securing
peace and justice.
In response, Associate Professor Bagshaw asserted that mediators cannot only focus
on the notions of peace and justice within the context of the conflict, but need to
focus on the ‘bigger picture’, which includes other factors such as culture.
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Q2. The second question asked Associate Professor Bagshaw to explain the potential
of mediation in situations where there are risk factors of mass atrocities.
Associate Professor Bagshaw replied that in such situations, the linear model of
mediation is not applicable, as what is needed is to get the people involved to
deconstruct the factors contributing to the conflict. Hence, she asserted that the
question is not only the potential of mediation in mitigating mass atrocities, but also
the skills of the mediator in understanding cultural sensitivities. Otherwise, the
mediator could contribute to the institutionalisation of factors that contribute to the
violence. However, Associate Professor Bagshaw also noted that the mediator
should be mindful of certain constraints, such as legal and human rights frameworks.
Hence, she noted that even if the goal of the mediator is to secure peace, it may be
difficult to attain a long term agreement if there are also other legal and human
rights issues. In such cases, she noted that short term agreements can make things
worse, as people may feel that grievances are not being heard. Sometimes
mediation just cannot solve all the issues.
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5. Panel Three: Transitional Justice After
Mass Atrocities
Political Manipulation at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia
Rebecca Gidley
About the Presenter:
Rebecca Gidley is a former intern at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to
Protect. In 2010, her report The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
and the Responsibility to Protect was published as a Centre Working Paper. Later
this year she hopes to intern at the ECCC.
Abstract:
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has been in operation
for four years with the Trial Chamber issuing a verdict in the first case in July 2010
and a second case expected to begin trial proceedings this year. Earlier attempts at
transitional justice, the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal and the Renakse petitions,
were driven by political motives and despite the ECCC’s claim to independence, its
design and operations have been fundamentally shaped by the political narrative
that the Cambodian government wishes to see perpetuated. In choosing a model of
transitional justice for Cambodia in the late 1990s and early 2000s decisions were
based not on what would be best for the Cambodian people but for the government;
this resulted in a model strongly controlled by the Cambodian executive and with a
strictly limited mandate. During the ECCC’s operation the government has worked to
ensure that the defendants and the witnesses at the court are restricted, especially
excluding any reference to the fact current members of the government are former
members of the Khmer Rouge. In doing so, the Cambodian government has
damaged the reputation of the ECCC as an independent judicial body, and the
limited scope of the trails may have broader implications for the possibility of longterm reconciliation in Cambodia.
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About the Presentation:
Rebecca Gidley opened the panel with her presentation, “Political Manipulation at
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia”. Ms Gidley began by
explaining the structure of the Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC), a hybrid transitional justice system with both Cambodian and international
participation. She explained that the majority of judges of the Court are Cambodian
and the government has substantial control over the judiciary and the proceedings
of the ECCC. Rules and voting regulations in the Court are complicated and attempt
to balance the influence of the two groups of participants. The Court has undertaken
two cases, one resulting in conviction and appeal, and a second case beginning later
in 2011. Ms Gidley then turned to the challenges posed by the current political
climate in Cambodia. In particular, she highlighted how the current ruling part in
Cambodia is the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) which has held power since 1979
when the Khmer Rouge was ousted from power. Members of the former Khmer
Rouge who defected to the Vietnamese supported government after 1979 are
members of the CPP and this must be considered when analysing Cambodian
Transitional Justice.
Other processes for Transitional Justice in Cambodia were mentioned in the
presentation. One of these, The Decree Law No 1 People’s Revolutionary Tribunal
conducted by the Vietnamese supported Cambodian government in August 1979,
had limited legal value and suffered from a lack of due process and credible defence.
It was focused on Pol Pot and Ieng Sary and failed to implicate others. In the 1980s a
process was conducted similar to a Truth and Reconciliation Commission involving
the gathering of information and public meetings, but these meetings were very
political and did not focus on individual experiences. Instead the government used
their control over the process in their favour, to cast themselves in a favourable light
and to criticise the United Nations. Finally, another mechanism for transitional
justice was negotiated in the late 1990s. In what eventually became the ECCC, it
involved a hybrid process of joint participation between the Cambodia government
and the UN. At the conclusion of negotiations, the Court was given the mandate to
try ‘senior leaders and those most responsible’ for the crimes committed during the
Khmer Rouge period, limiting the number of potential defendants.
From this introduction to transitional justice in Cambodia, Ms Gidley continued to
explore the political nature of the ECCC through the limitations on defendants and
witnesses. To highlight some of the challenges faced by the Court, Ms Gidley first
gave the example of the actions of the Cambodian government in opposing potential
cases 003 and 004 (which may include defendants currently serving in government).
Ms Gidley explained how, in December 2008, the international prosecutors sought
permission to proceed with these cases. The Cambodian co-prosecutors were
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against this action and the initial permission to investigate these cases by the
Cambodian investigating judge was swiftly retracted; Ms Gidley believes this
suggests government control. This suspicion was supported by the similarities
between the language used by judges and the government spokespersons in refuting
permission to prosecute the additional cases. Following this, the Cambodian
government declared that there will be no case following 002.
Ms Gidley also examined another case of suspected government interference in the
running of the Court by highlighting the example of the refusal by CPP members to
appear as witnesses. In September 2009, the Court issued summons for 6 CPP
leaders but the government maintained that they would not participate in ECCC
proceedings. Ms Gidley suggests that the government is attempting to prevent those
with links to the past appearing so as to maintain the perception of the CPP as the
liberators of Cambodia. While police can compel witnesses to appear at the Court
this was never publically considered.
Finally, Ms Gidley considered the effects of the Cambodian government’s control
over the ECCC and concluded: first, by not challenging the government’s narrative,
the Court may increase the perceived legitimacy of the Cambodian government and
its control of proceedings; second, the reputation of the Court may have been
damaged amongst the Cambodian population. When the Court publically called for
CPP party members to appear as witnesses it indicated that CPP links with the Khmer
Rouge were being concealed but the number of people who will access this
information is limited. Ms Gidley raised questions about the merits of focusing on a
small group of people responsible considering the time which has passed and how
much effect 003 and 004, involving only 5 defendants, could really have.

“Maximising” transitional justice opportunities: the case of East
Timor’s CAVR
Heather Castel
About the Presenter:
Dr Heather Castel taught the Genocide and Persecution course in the School of
History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics at The University of Queensland in 2010.
Her primary research interests are in the area of transitional justice, particularly the
cases of South Africa and East Timor.
Abstract:
“Maximising” its opportunities to promote truth and reconciliation was a key issue in
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). East Timor’s
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) heeded this lesson and
incorporated this principle into its operations. East Timor’s history had been written
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primarily by foreign scholars and highly contested by an illegal occupying power that
had utilised the powerful politics of denial. Despite the CAVR having less
opportunities to “maximise” its operations and less political influence than the TRC,
its operations have contributed to the continuing debate on transitional justice with
the establishment of innovative mechanisms that re-wrote the national East
Timorese narrative, curbed denials and comprehensively established responsibility
for crimes against humanity from 1976 - 1999. It has set some important transitional
justice precedents as the first-ever Asian truth commission. Its utilisation of
traditional, restorative law in its Community Reconciliation Process programmes was
relatively successful and its National Public Hearings were themed hearings, mostly
tailored to the provisions of international law that gave acknowledgement to victims
that their violations were universally recognised crimes.
About the Presentation:
Dr Castel explained how the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission had
benefitted from a robust mandate and the power to grant amnesties, set its own
agenda, subpoena people and set search warrants. In contrast, the CAVR was limited
by its lack of independence and limited resources. The South African TRC achieved
international attention and quickly translated testimonies into English but East
Timor’s public relations efforts were not as successful. Both South African and East
Timorese processes encouraged open forum statements and they both travelled to
receive statements from those who wished to testify, instead of expecting those
reporting to come to the court.
The CAVR emphasised the reporting of crimes and atrocities, particularly those
which occurred in 1999. Hearings were related to: political imprisonments, torture,
sexual crimes, forced displacement, famine, massacre and the rights of children. Dr
Castel contrasted this to the South African context, where available resources meant
hearings considered the complicity of the state in connection to: business, the health
sector, the media, faith and other categories. The East Timorese government wished
to focus on national unity and reconciliation throughout the process and favoured a
conciliatory approach with Indonesia. This is different to South Africa where the
focus was apartheid as a crime against humanity.
Dr Castel believes that the CAVR maximized its opportunities through a focus on
crimes which allowed them to include past and historical crimes; this makes it more
thorough than the South African approach. Dr Castel considered the CAVR to have
had good outcomes despite its limited funding and resources. One of the outcomes
was a good quality report but Dr Castel cautioned the workshop participants that
‘truth’ is always disputable, even in the results of Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions.

Legacies and Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities in the Asia-Pacific: A Workshop Report
24

Righting the wrong after genocide? The global search for post-conflict
justice
Raymond Lau
About the Presenter:
Raymond Lau is currently a PhD student at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect.
Abstract:
Genocide and mass atrocities are all too frequently recurring phenomena. But in
recent years the world has seen a growing acknowledgment of seeking
accountability for past atrocities. Progress in the development of post-conflict justice
is evidenced by the establishment of International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, new hybrid international-national war crimes courts and
the coming into existence of the International Criminal Court (ICC). While ‘bringing
the devil to justice’ may be the overarching goal in the aftermath of mass atrocities,
the emphasis that states and international organisations place on advancing
‘accountability’ can be quite different. This paper explores the rationale of the
search for accountability in the aftermath of mass violence. In particular, by
questioning the tendency of adopting a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach in specific cases,
it asks whether international awareness of advancing post-conflict justice could be
translated into meaningful prevention of future occurrences of such atrocities.

About the Presentation:
Mr Lau considered the development of post-conflict justice and the rationale of
searching for accountability. The establishment of international and hybrid tribunals
in recent years suggests an increased interest in seeking accountability for violators
of international humanitarian law. Mr Lau considers this a relatively recent
phenomenon with a basis in the Nuremberg trials. The importance of justice is
explained by a number of perspectives including: the backward looking perspective,
based on retributive justice where individuals deserve punishment to right a wrong;
the forward looking perspective, which has a utilitarian justification and punishment
is used to achieve good results for society, through deterrence; and the expression
perspective, which aims to restore the rule of law and educate about the crimes
committed. Mr Lau suggests there is a strong preference for retribution and
deterrence. The International Criminal Court was established in 2002 to end
impunity and deter potential future atrocities. It has two aims, retribution and
deterrence. This shows an accepted connection between holding the perpetrators
accountable and atrocity prevention.
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Taking a critical approach to these changes in international criminal justice, Mr Lau
considered a number of problematic aspects of the international criminal judicial
system. First, it presupposes an international standard but international criminal law
simply extends Western Anglo-American law. Second, the ICC is intended to warn
perpetrators of atrocities that the international community will not accept their
actions,yet the institution is inherently responsive, rather than pre-emptive. Third,
justice is not always supportive of peace and the threat of prosecution may prolong
conflicts as leaders attempt to maintain power to avoid charges. Additionally, justice
that takes place in the international criminal judicial system is likely to have the
international community as the primary audience and victims as the secondary
audience.
Panel Three Questions and Answers
Q1: Raymond Lau was called to comment on the role of the ICC in raising awareness
of mass atrocity crimes, considering the Eichmann Trial (1961-1962) as an example
of raising awareness of the Holocaust. Mr Lau responded that thinking about the ICC
as a means of raising awareness leads to questions such as: who are we seeking
justice for? Who is the true target audience? Is it just public relations? Mr Lau
considered this putting the system in danger of having conflicting goals and an
incoherent focus. A discussion of whether justice as an act of deterrence is a
disservice to victims led to a dialogue on the subject of reparations led by Heather
Castel, during which the suggestion was made by Deborah Mayersen that
reparations carry a symbolic value beyond their economic impact.
Q2: Rebecca Gidley was asked to comment on whether she thought two cases would
be enough to sustain the positive public perceptions of the court. Ms Gidley
responded that there had never been an expectation of more than ten cases and it is
difficult to say how many defendants would be considered a suitable number by the
public. The sentence given in case 001 (now under appeal) of 30 years to Kaing Guek
Eav, responsible for the deaths of over 12,000 people, was given as an example of
the imperfect nature of the Court.
Q3: Dr Castel was asked if the South African amnesty, conditional on guilt, was
beneficial to reconciliation. Dr Castel responded that results were mixed. It was clear
that jurists in the ANC (African National Congress) were determined that the
amnesty was provided as a response to self-incriminating evidence. This approach
meant that victims learnt more about who was responsible. However, reconciliation
is a slow process and requires political will which has not been maintained and this
failure to support the process combined with a lack of effective redistribution of
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wealth has led to continuing social problems. Dr Castel suggested it was good to
discuss atrocities openly as it does offer some closure but that this is just a starting
point.
Q4: Dr Castel was also asked to comment on the value of reconciliation groups and
other mechanisms. She responded that many mechanisms had been attempted in
Cambodia but they were Western-centric and this diminished their value. Dr Castel
suggested these mechanisms would benefit from further consultation, so as to
understand the local culture. In South Africa there were ad hoc groups but money
was squandered which could have addressed problems of development. In East
Timor this opportunity did not exist due to insufficient resources; they were not in a
position to give reparations and Indonesia would not offer reparations.
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6. Exhibition Launch and Public Lecture
Lessons from Rwanda:
The United Nations and the Prevention of Genocide
“Preventing genocide is a collective and individual responsibility. Rwanda’s survivors
have made us confront the ugly reality of a preventable tragedy. The only way to
truly honour the memory of those who perished in Rwanda 17 years ago is to ensure
such events can never occur again.” - UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
The University of Queensland was honoured to host the United Nations Department
of Public Information exhibition, ‘Lessons from Rwanda: The United Nations and the
Prevention of Genocide’ in its premiere showing in Australia. The exhibition was set
up in the Foyer of the Social Sciences and Humanities Library, a space which attracts
a high volume of students and staff on a daily basis. The exhibition was formally
launched by Professor Gillian Whitehouse, Head of School, School of Political Science
and International Studies, The University of Queensland.
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Public Lecture: The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A View from Critical
Transitional Justice Studies
Alex Hinton
About the Presenter:
Professor Alex Hinton is Founder and Director of the Center for the Study of
Genocide, Conflict Resolution, and Human Rights and Professor of Anthropology and
Global Affairs at Rutgers University, Newark. He is the author of the award-winning
Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide, and most recently editor of
Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after Genocide and Mass
Violence. Professor Hinton is the current president of the International Association
of Genocide Scholars.
Abstract:
On July 1, 2009, civil party Bou Meng took the stand during the first case being held
by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC or “Khmer Rouge
Tribunal”), an international hybrid tribunal established to try the surviving leaders of
the Khmer Rouge. Elevated on a raised dais in front of Bou Meng sat the trial
chamber, comprising three Cambodian and two international jurists. To his right sat
Duch, the former commandant of S-21, the secret interrogation and torture center
where Bou Meng had been imprisoned during the Khmer Rouge regime (April 17,
1975 to January 6, 1979). Over 12,283 people perished at S-21, which was at the
epicenter of a campaign of mass murder and repression that resulted in the death of
perhaps 1.7 million of Cambodia’s 8 million inhabitants. Bou Meng was one of only a
handful of survivors, a man who had only lived because he could paint portraits of
Pol Pot. This presentation explores Bou Meng’s day at the court from the perspective
of critical transitional justice studies. Specifically, it explores what the act of
testifying and witnessing meant to Bou Meng, how his subject position and voice
were produced in the juridical context, and what the speech acts of witnesses like
Bou Meng and others at the tribunal mean in different discursive communities,
ranging from international court personnel to villagers on the ground in Cambodia.
The lecture concludes by considering what insights gleaned from the Khmer Rouge
Tribunal have to say more broadly about transitional justice, genocide prevention,
and the attempt to seek redress after genocide.
About the Lecture:
The Workshop’s public lecture was presented by Professor Alex Hinton, entitled ‘The
Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A View from Critical Transitional Justice Studies.’ Professor
Hinton’s presentation considered the importance of a critical view of transitional
justice in the Cambodian context, illustrating this through the example of Case 001
of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Professor Hinton had
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followed the process throughout, considering the differing understandings of justice
and the court process.
The defendant, Kaing Guek Eav, known as Duch, oversaw Tuol Sleng during the
Khmer Rouge regime. The Civil Parties were 66 people acknowledged as direct
victims. Some of these victims, including Bou Meng, survived Tuol Sleng because
they were skilled in trades required by the prison. Professor Hinton described the
experience of Bou Meng and the Civil Parties in the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia. He expressed that they sometimes found themselves overcome
with emotion as they faced the perpetrator of the crimes against them and
recounted their horrific experiences.
The trial began on 30 March 2009 and presented the verdict and sentencing on 26
July 2010. The trial is currently in a state of appeal. The charges involved Crimes
Against Humanity and Grave Breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention. Duch
accepted responsibility before the court and this cooperation is believed to have
prevented the court from sentencing him to life in prison; instead the guilty verdict
resulted in a 35 year sentence. This would mean that there was a limited chance
Duch would live out such a sentence. Reparations included statements of apology
and acknowledgement of responsibility, to be posted on the ECCC’s official website.
Professor Hinton drew the audience’s attention to the lack of access most affected
persons would have to the internet and differing opinions over the sentencing.
Professor Hinton considered the definition of Transitional Justice and how it
emerged, historically. Professor Hinton emphasised the importance of considering
what the tribunal and justice mean to Cambodians. ‘Transitional’ implies teleology
and suggests states journeying from primitive violence through Western notions of
justice to a perceived end point of conflict recovery. Professor Hinton explained the
value of critical transitional justice as a means of unpacking ‘common sense’
assumptions to find their origin and determining how relevant they were for the
people affected by violence. He described ‘moments of slippage’ at the courts. An
example of this is when victims showed emotion during the court proceedings. The
judges were not prepared for this and requested they control their emotions or else
the courts would recess.
Judge: Do you think [your wife was] killed at S-21?
Bou Meng: Your question reminds me [of] a question that I would like to ask Mr
Kaing Guek Eav. I want to know whether he asked his subordinates to smash my wife
at S-21 or at Choeung Ek so that I could collect the ashes or remains so that I can
make her soul rest in peace.
Judge: You have not answered my question ...
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Professor Hinton also considered the symbolic meaning of the ECCC emblem. The
emblem is a hybrid between the traditional Cambodian depiction of justice and
Western understandings of justice with a figure from the Angkor period holding a
sword, surrounded by a wreath of olive branches. The Cambodian figure of justice
holds a sword to symbolise the authority of the court and is usually accompanied by
two aids who consult scrolls of law. In contrast Lady Justice is blindfolded and holds
scales to symbolise impartiality. Professor Hinton believes the different
representations show different understandings of justice but that this has not been
questioned.
To further illustrate the differing perceptions of justice, Professor Hinton referred to
a Khmer Rouge Tribunal outreach booklet released by the Khmer Institute of
Democracy and identified how it, like the courts, provides a limited view of a
complex history and complex culture. The booklet shows how a person is
transformed into a democratic citizen who gains rights and becomes a civil party.
The booklet, part of a court outreach program, does not engage with the
complexities of varied understandings of justice. Professor Hinton emphasised that
transitional justice mechanisms are always highly politicised and that the Cambodian
Courts are no different; but it is for this reason that it is important to question the
assumptions of tribunals.
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Public Lecture Question and Answer
During question time Professor Hinton was asked his opinion of Truth Commissions
and suggested these too are highly politicised to produce a certain truth and a
particular result; they have value but must be examined critically.
Also questioned was the role of international courts in dealing with the international
community’s feelings of guilt. Professor Hinton suggested the idea of the Court as a
mechanism for resolving the international community’s guilt is true to some extent
and suggests that for this reason donations should also be analysed as gifts that
create a ‘moral hierarchy’.
The final question asked about the Cambodian understanding of the court. Professor
Hinton suggested that Buddhism is one way in which the Cambodian people
understand justice and that some old people believe the guilty will be reborn as
lower forms. He expanded on this point with an anecdotal reference to the view of
monks. When he asked a monk “Why did you go to the tribunal?” the monk did not
respond: “To see justice served”, but rather “To see what’s going on”, indicating that
Buddhists do not see justice in the operations of the Court.
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7. Panel Four: Early Warning and Prevention
of Genocide and Mass Atrocities
Political Instability and Large-Scale Violence in the Economic North and
South: Is the process different for richer and poorer societies?
Benjamin Goldsmith, Arcot Sowmya and Dimitri Semenovich
About the Presenters:
Associate Professor Ben Goldsmith is an Associate Professor in the Department of
Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney. He is the
author of Imitation in International Relations: Observational Learning, Analogies, and
Foreign Policy in Russia and Ukraine. Professor Arcot Sowmya is a Professor in the
School of Computer Science and Engineering at The University of New South Wales.
Professor Sowmya’s research interests are in the area of image analysis and
recognition, and software engineering. Dimitri Semenovich (non-presenting coauthor) is a PhD Student in the School of Computer Science and Engineering at The
University of New South Wales.
Abstract:
This paper builds on existing scholarship in the areas of political instability, state
failure, and mass violence (e.g., Harff 2003; Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004). It
introduces two innovations, which add to understanding of the processes leading to
serious political instability in states, and those leading from instability to large-scale
violence. First, it distinguishes between North and South in economic terms by
examining the processes separately based on higher and lower per capita gross
domestic product. Second, it employs 2-stage selection models to correct for
potential selection bias (Heckman 1979; Sartori 2003). Thus, the quantitative analysis
will answer the questions of whether the processes leading to the most serious
instances of internal violence are different for richer and poorer states, and whether
current understanding of this process in the quantitative literature is biased by
failure to consider selection effects explicitly.
About the Presentation:
The first presentation in this panel was “Political Instability and Large-Scale Violence
in the Economic North and South: Is the process different for richer and poorer
Legacies and Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities in the Asia-Pacific: A Workshop Report
33

societies?” Associate Professor Goldsmith offered workshop participants the
opportunity to see the pattern recognition work the group are undertaking related
to instability and large scale violence (mass atrocities, mass killing and large scale
violence in civil wars) with the ultimate goal of creating software relevant to policy
makers. Two areas of interest for the researchers were: firstly, if there is a
difference between richer and poorer countries in the causes of large scale violence;
and secondly, to analyse whether it is important to think of the path to large scale
violence as a process, with more than one stage.
Associate Professor Goldsmith presented a visualisation of large scale violence and
instability, displayed chronologically starting at 1960. Within the model ‘large scale
violence’ was defined as the killing of one thousand people within a year and
‘political instability’ was determined by the Political Instability Taskforce’s
assessment. The variables of interest were: military personnel; regime type;
durability of the regime; GDP per capita; and others. The project aims to accurately
forecast political instability for the following year; and in cases of instability the
likelihood of mass violence. It is important to note that the model is still under
development and findings thus far are tentative.
Associate Professor Goldsmith shared with the workshop participants some of the
team’s hypotheses related to the project, including: that some actors involved in
political instability also contemplate large-scale violence from the outset, meaning
that selection bias is a danger for analysis of large-scale violence outcomes; that
there will be a difference between the causal processes for richer and poorer states;
and that wealthier states will have more capacity to resist large scale violence.
Many variables initially under examination have been found to be not robustly
significant under this model; such as democracy with factions and elections. Other
interesting outcomes from the project so far include that Gross Domestic Product
per capita has not been identified as a significant cause of Large Scale Violence once
its role in general political instability is considered. Results have also supported the
view that newer regimes are not statistically subject to great instability but states
which are poor and have very large armies have a higher incidence of large scale
violence. Partial Democracy with factions is considered the most robust variable in
the model for forecasting instability but as this variable remains quite constant over
time it is difficult to use this variable to predict year-to-year instability. Partial
democracy with factions has a negative correlation to large scale violence and full
democracy appears to have a pacifying effect on situations of political instability,
suggesting that regime type does matter.
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Understanding the Relationship between Risk and Resilience in the
Long Term Prevention of Mass Atrocities: An Examination of Botswana
and Zambia
Stephen McLoughlin
About the Presenter:
Stephen McLoughlin is a PhD student at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility
to Protect. Most recently he presented a paper at the International Network of
Genocide Scholars conference in Sussex in July 2010.
Abstract:
Too often, approaches to the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities are limited
by a tendency to focus on what goes wrong, instead of what goes right. The purpose
of this presentation is to provide a framework for analysis that will enable a greater
understanding of why some countries that are located in vulnerable regions have not
experienced genocide or other mass atrocities. Providing a focus on why such crimes
have not occurred, rather than solely on why they have, will yield insights into the
way that genocide and other mass atrocities can be prevented. The concept of
prevention is premised on the identifying and addressing of ‘root causes’. This is
problematic because it assumes a linear inevitability of a particular outcome. To put
it simply, addressing root causes of potential genocide or mass atrocities is not
enough to ensure effective prevention, as it does not accurately account for the
complex range of factors that both increase and mitigate risk. It is the incorporation
of mitigating factors into this framework that gives insight into the complex
contingencies that characterise the risk of genocide and mass atrocities. In
examining this interplay of factors, the paper utilises the examples of Botswana and
Zambia. Both countries have been referred to as African models - Botswana for its
stable economic growth and robust multi-party democracy, and Zambia for being the
first country on the continent to enjoy a peaceful transition from a one party state to
a multi-party democratic form of governance. Despite this, both countries have
displayed a number of risk factors, which are associated with mass atrocities. Using
these countries as case studies, this presentation offers a different approach to
prevention, one which looks at the way resilience factors within countries are able to
mitigate the risk of mass atrocities.
About the Presentation:
The second presentation in this panel was “Understanding the relationship between
risk and resilience in the long term prevention of mass atrocities: An examination of
Botswana and Zambia,” by Stephen McLoughlin. This presentation investigated the
social, political and economic factors which mitigate violence, using Botswana and
Zambia as examples. Mr McLoughlin described the conditions of the San Bushman of
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the Kalahari Game Reserve, a minority group who suffered discrimination. They were
mass evacuated from and denied access to wells but they appealed to the judicial
system and the resulting ruling was in their favour, classing the government’s actions
as illegal. Mr McLoughlin identified the effective operation of a legal system which
can offer support to the struggles of groups, like the Basarwa, as a safety net. It is an
example of a genocide prevention measure, as managing diversity is an important
aspect in preventing the escalation of violence.
Mr McLoughlin continued by considering structural prevention through comparisons
with public health models, premised on the idea of identifying root causes. In the
public health context this approach is criticised by medical researchers as it creates
grey areas between health and disease, and over-diagnosis can create sickness in
healthy patients. Building upon these criticisms in the prevention of violence Mr
McLoughlin identified problems with the current approach to mass atrocity
prevention: the absence of consensus on the root causes of past atrocities; the
limited progress toward resolving root causes of civil war; and the assumption of a
linear inevitability of mass violence, ignoring the prevention of mass atrocities in
certain states. Mr McLoughlin reminded the audience of the view of UN Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon - that further research is required to explain why mass violence
erupts in some states but not in others. This presentation also reflected on the
somewhat contradictory nature of diagnosing root causes and the Responsibility to
Protect; as the former assumes a third party is required to prescribe solutions while
the latter emphasises the responsibility of the state to protect their citizens.
Mr McLoughlin suggested that it is important to consider the preconditions of mass
atrocities, as mass violence rarely occurs without these preconditions and this
provides a level of risk, but that the mitigating factors are also worth considering.
To further explore the value of mitigating factors, Mr McLoughlin presented the
example of Zambia. Zambia underwent a peaceful transition from a single party state
to a multi-party democracy in 1991 but is ranked tenth in the world in terms of risk
of political instability, according to the Centre for International Development and
Conflict Management. The identified pre-conditions for mass violence in Zambia
include: social division, as there is a growing emphasis on ethno-linguistic identity in
the selection of political leaders; limited democracy, for example the office of the
president is extremely powerful and opposition parties suffer harassment; limited
rule of law, as the judiciary is not impartial and corruption and police harassment
occur; and inequality of economic opportunity, as Zambia is poor and wealth is
highly concentrated amongst a small number of people. The mitigating factors
identified in Zambia include: social cohesion and ethnic fluidity, as ethnic groups
have a colonial, rather than historical basis, and are thus relatively new; a strong civil
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society, which can support democratic reform; government management of ethnic
diversity; and the peaceful transition to democracy. Mr McLoughlin suggested that
these mitigating factors help prevent mass atrocity violence and that it is important
to increase understanding of the link between the factors which mitigate and those
which increase the risk of mass atrocity violence in states.

Why Not Genocide? Exploring Constraints that Inhibit Genocide Onset
in at-risk Societies
Deborah Mayersen
About the Presenter:
Dr Deborah Mayersen is Program Leader for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass
Atrocities at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Her research
interests include genocide prevention and the Armenian and Rwandan genocides.
Abstract:
In January 1962, United Nations Commissioner to Rwanda Majid Rahnema warned of
the imminent danger of genocide there. In Rwandan society he saw “the symptoms
of an explosive situation”, and accused the ruling party of a policy “apparently
designed to eliminate ... the Tutsi minority.” Mr. Rahnema was correct about the
danger of genocide, but seriously misjudged its imminence. While ethnic massacres
did erupt in the country within two years of his warning, they were very rapidly
quelled, and a further three decades passed before the 1994 genocide. Similar
predictions of extermination also preceded the 1915 Armenian genocide by some
decades. We can infer from the genocides that eventually occurred in these cases
that the observations of risk were real. Yet in both Ottoman Turkey and Rwanda
there were significant pre-genocidal massacres that did not escalate into genocide.
These massacres can be considered as examples where genocide might have been
expected to occur, but did not materialise. What prevented the violence from
escalating into genocide in these cases? What can we learn from them about
constraints against genocide? If we consider each of these examples of pregenocidal massacres in conjunction with the subsequent genocides that occurred,
key differences can be identified that influenced the extent and nature of the violent
outbreaks. These provide new insights as to how constraints can effectively inhibit
states from adopting genocidal policies and practices, even in circumstances of
substantial risk.
About the Presentation:
Dr Mayersen began the presentation by suggesting that while the common focus in
genocide prevention is the pre-conditions and risk escalation associated with
genocide, it is also important to look at the constraints in situations where there is a
grave risk of genocide, but it does not occur. Two cases of pre-genocidal massacres
were presented, in Rwanda in 1963-64 and in Ottoman Armenia in 1894-96, to
identify the constraints involved which limited the extent of the massacres.
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In the 1880s and early 1890s ‘a deliberate policy of extermination’ and ‘a settled
plan to slowly exterminate’ the Armenian minority were reported in Ottoman
Armenia. As Christians in a Muslim empire, the Ottoman Armenians had been
considered second class citizens but the decline of the Ottoman Empire led to an
increase in persecution against the Armenians. The Treaty of Berlin aimed to aid the
Armenians and allow them to practice their religion but led to further persecution
and sporadic violence. The Armenians became adept at fighting Kurdish groups who
attacked them. In 1894, aided by soldiers from the regular army, the Kurds attacked,
resulting in the destruction of half the villages in the Sassoun region as well as
massacres, rape and slaughter. Britain and France called for an end to the violence
when the death numbered 6000, yet massacres continued sporadically. From 1894
to 1896 over 100,000 Armenians were killed in what became known as the Hamidian
massacres, but they cannot be regarded as a global attempt to exterminate the
Armenian minority. A massacre in Constantinople in August 1896, witnessed by
many European diplomats, led to an international outcry that contributed to the
cessation of massacres.
In January 1962, 32 years before the Rwandan genocide, the UN Visiting Commission
to Rwanda reported that the government was “Adopting a social policy apparently
designed to eliminate … the Tutsi minority”. Just two years later in December 1963
and January 1964 several thousand Tutsi were killed in ethnic massacres, but they
remained limited in scope and duration. Many historical factors contributed to the
massacres, including a long history of inequality between the Hutu majority and
Tutsi minority, the institutionalisation of racial policies under Belgian colonial rule
and the political upheaval associated with decolonisation.
Dr Mayersen identified several factors in each case which may have prevented these
massacres from escalating into genocide. In the Hamidian Massacres these included
international factors in the form of the threat of European intervention, the
ideological factor of the established place of Armenians within the Ottoman Empire,
combined with the weakness of the Empire. In Rwanda, the massacres were limited
by the size of the army, poor communications across the country, the perceived
possibility of international intervention and the lack of an extremist ideology.
Dr Mayersen determined from this that international and ideological factors as well
as a lack of capacity to commit genocide can have a constraint effect. International
engagement can be effective, if it is both timely and perceived as genuine;
intervention 2-5 years before genocide can disrupt the development of genocidal
ideology and prevent genocide from being attempted. There is also a relationship
between the power and capacity of a regime and the development of a genocidal
ideology.
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Panel Four Question and Answer
Q1: The first question posed to the panel related to the state-centric model of
genocide and how genocide is defined. Deborah Mayersen responded first saying
that the Rwandan mass atrocities of the 1960s were not called genocide at the time,
not even by the UN. She determined this was a result of comparisons made to the
Holocaust and genocide as the death of millions of people. She continued that the
massacres in Rwanda in the 1960s are considered genocide in recent quantitative
studies. Dr Mayersen defines genocide based on intention and in the Armenian and
Rwandan massacres she presented, the intention was not to exterminate the groups.
Ben Goldsmith added that considering intent is a typical assessment mechanism and
in relation to the question of why genocide is considered with a state-focus, in his
study it was a result of data availability. Discussion then led to suggestions that there
should be further investigation of localised models of mass atrocity analysis and that
genocidal massacres may be a preferable term for smaller scale events. Also raised
was the importance of genocide definitions as Crimes Against Humanity becomes
entrenched in law.
Q2: A question addressed to Ben Goldsmith requested clarification about the way
elections effect his model and whether there is a lag. Dr Goldsmith responded that
there is a forward lag and that all elections are included in the model but only some
have a significant effect. Generally, elections have been noted to provide a forum for
political disagreement that can allow states to maintain stability. Dr Goldsmith
emphasised that the model at this stage was best at revealing the preconditions for
violence and not why violence or instability might be expected within a short time
frame; for this reason time sensitive factors are a key area of current investigation.
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8. Panel Five: The United Nations,
Sovereignty and International Intevention in
Mass Atrocity Crimes
Political Realism, Sovereignty and Intervention: Is Genocide Prevention
Really Possible in a World of Sovereign States?
Paul Bartrop
About the Presenter:
Dr Paul Bartrop is the Ida E. King Distinguished Visiting Professor in Holocaust and
Genocide Studies at Richard Stockton College, New Jersey. His most recent
published works include Fifty Key Thinkers on the Holocaust and Genocide (with
Steven Jacobs, 2010) and The Genocide Studies Reader (co-edited with Samuel
Totten, 2009).
Abstract:
This paper argues that the major inhibition to states intervening to prevent or stop
genocide is the very states system prevailing in the world today. While it is true that
the global move in recent decades towards the furtherance of internationalist
principles has seen much in the way of international law-making and law-enforcing
with regard to genocide, the single most decisive factor standing in the way of
genocide prevention has been found in the reality of the world of nations;
accordingly, states find intervention in humanitarian issues to be a luxury which
often will not be pursued on the grounds of simple nation self-interest. While this
depressing (and, some might say, old-fashioned and obvious) perspective leaves
little room for optimism, there are examples from history that suggest it might be
the most logical way of explaining why states do not (or do) become involved in the
internal affairs of others for the purpose of stopping genocide. This paper considers
why the international states system has not been successful in preventing state
intervention to stop genocide, and further, shows why it was that such initiatives as
international legislation and the creation of supposedly cooperative bodies as the
United Nations have been neutralized by the persistence of Realpolitik in relations
between states. It concludes with a reflection on what this signifies for the future of
genocide prevention and intervention, and whether, as a result, existing strategies
are likely to be effective in the 21st century.
About the Presentation:
Dr Bartrop argued that it is the high priority given to state sovereignty that has
inhibited states from intervening in other states to stop or prevent genocide. In
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order to support this argument, he provided several examples of past initiatives that
have been undertaken by the international community, but which have been of
limited utility due to concerns regarding state sovereignty. The first of these
examples was the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which laid down important
guidelines regarding the conduct of war and the prospects for diminishing the risks
of war. Dr. Bartrop acknowledged that these conventions were important in that
they set ideals that all states should aspire to, and codified actions that could be
considered war crimes. However, despite the humanitarian standards that these
conventions emphasized, Dr. Bartrop asserted that these conventions failed to
establish any enforcement mechanisms (sanctions), such as an international court in
which perpetrators of human rights abuses and war crimes could be tried. This was
largely due to concerns raised by signatory states regarding the effects that such
mechanisms may have for the impingement of their sovereignty. Hence, Dr. Bartrop
noted that while the Hague Conventions were important in establishing
humanitarian standards, they failed to adequately set up the mechanisms through
which the international community could intervene to stop or prevent genocide.
Following this, Dr. Bartrop focused on the role that the League of Nations played in
preventing genocide. He argued while the League conceptualised a new world order
based on diplomacy and the rule of law, little was discussed in the way of
multilateral intervention. The result was that member states were extremely
unwilling to engage in any actions such as peacekeeping or multilateral diplomacy,
which they perceived as an impingement upon other states’ sovereignty, and, by
interpolation, upon their own sovereignty.
However, despite the failure of the League of Nations to bring about lasting peace,
as was signified by the outbreak of the Second World War, Dr. Bartrop argued it did
highlight certain important issues that needed to be addressed. Firstly, the
international community realised the urgent need to set up mechanisms that would
constrain state behaviour regardless of the effects this may have on sovereignty. Dr.
Bartrop also argued that the Second World War was pivotal in emphasizing the need
to hold not only states, but also individuals responsible for their actions during times
of war. This meant that no one was above the rule of law, and individuals could no
longer hide behind the excuse of following the orders of superiors to avoid
punishment for war crimes. As Dr. Bartrop noted, these developments were
significant as they eventually led to the codification of the Nuremberg Conventions.
Nevertheless, Dr. Bartrop noted that the most important contribution for the
prevention of genocide was made by the United Nations, in the form of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). The
reason why this Convention was such a landmark document with regard to the
prevention of genocide, coming as it did as the result of a series of political
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compromises on the part of the great powers during the Cold War, was because it
specifically defined the acts that could be considered as genocide, and asserted that
persons committing such acts would be tried by a tribunal of the state in the
territory of which the act was committed, or by an international penal tribunal.
Despite these important contributions, Dr. Bartrop noted that even the Genocide
Convention has not been able to adequately convince the international community
to intervene for the prevention of genocide, as was evident by the lack of action
taken by the international community in even the gravest cases of genocide, such as
in Bosnia and Rwanda.
The presentation then focused one of the most controversial attempts undertaken
by NATO to prevent genocide, a campaign referred to as Operation Allied Force. This
was in response to a massive campaign of ethnic cleansing carried out by the Serbian
government against the Albanian population in Kosovo. While supporters of NATO
argued that this signified that NATO would not tolerate such atrocities by
governments, Dr. Bartrop emphasized that it is important to keep in mind that
NATO’s interests primarily lie in the maintenance of peace in the North Atlantic
region, and hence, is not an alliance that is active in genocide prevention.
Furthermore, he noted that this invasion was highly criticised as being an act of
aggression, due the fact that it was carried out without the approval of the UN
Security Council.
In his concluding remarks, Dr. Batrtop asserted that there are no easy solutions to
mitigate the reservations that states have in playing a more active role in genocide
prevention, which are based on concerns for national sovereignty. He also noted
that while physical intervention may be effective, states should be careful to get UN
approval in order to prevent such actions being classified as an act of aggression.
Furthermore, Dr. Bartrop argued that in order to ensure a world without genocide,
the UN should be given greater authority to impinge on sovereignty, and there needs
be greater firmness, political will and cooperation of all international players. He
noted that while it is unlikely for all of this to come together soon, there remains
great hope that it will crystallise and become effective sometime in the 21st century.

The UN Security Council and Mass Atrocity Crimes: Prevention or
Reaction?
Jess Gifkins
About the Presenter: Jess Gifkins is a PhD student at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect.

Legacies and Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities in the Asia-Pacific: A Workshop Report
42

Abstract:
The complex and convoluted dynamics involved in drafting resolutions in the United
Nations Security Council mean that it can often take months of negotiations before
weak, compromise resolutions are tabled. The slow and politically challenging nature
of this process raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of the Security Council
in responding to mass atrocity crimes in a timely and decisive manner, as agreed to
at the 2005 World Summit. The Council was designed to be a selective body,
particularly with the veto power of the five permanent members, and this raises
further challenges for the Council in taking action when mass atrocity crimes are
imminent or ongoing. This raises important questions about where the focus of the
responsibility to protect is, and should be, in responding to mass atrocity crimes.
Prevention and early engagement are often cited as the preferable and most cost
effective response to mass atrocity crimes, but it is also important to note that we
cannot necessarily rely on a timely and decisive response from the Security Council
once the situation has deteriorated to the point where a robust response from the
Council is needed. This further strengthens the role of the preventative aspects of
the responsibility to protect.
About the Presentation:
Ms Gifkins began her presentation by providing a brief background to the
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. Within this context, she noted that the R2P is
based in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document,
and includes the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity and their incitement. Ms Gifkins also asserted that the R2P was
significantly a response to the questions that had emerged in the 1990s about
whether there was a ‘right to intervention’.
The presentation then focused on the three pillars which make up the R2P doctrine,
and which are highlighted in paragraph 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit
outcome document. Ms Gifkins identified the first pillar as being the responsibility of
all states to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against humanity. The second pillar was highlighted as being the
responsibility of the international community to help states to uphold these
responsibilities. The third pillar of the R2P was stated as being the responsibility of
the Security Council to take collective action where a state ‘manifestly fails’ to
protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity.
Ms Gifkins also emphasized there are some disagreements as to whether R2P should
be conceptualised as a speech act or a policy agenda. In explaining this, she drew
onto arguments of Eli Stamnes who contented that ‘speaking R2P’ will eventually
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lead to more robust action. Ms Gifkins noted that Gareth Evans holds a similar view,
who also suggests that only a dozen situations at any one point in time can be
defined as R2P situations. She highlighted that such views are in direct opposition to
the way that R2P is conceptualised by Alex Bellamy, who perceives R2P as being
applicable to all states at all times and thus, is a deep policy agenda.
Following this, Ms Gifkins focused on the array of barriers that R2P faces, with
regards to ‘automatic’ R2P reaction by the United Nations Security Council. She
noted that the first barrier is the power that the permanent five members in the
Council have to formally veto any resolution from being passed. While
recommendations have been made to limit the power of the veto with regards to
situations involving genocide or crimes against humanity, these recommendations
have not been supported by the P5. Nevertheless, Ms Gifkins did observe that formal
vetos are very rarely used. What is more frequent is the informal veto, which means
that the permanent five often threaten to veto a particular resolution if it is put to
vote. In this way, they are often successful in ensuring that issues that are not in
their interests are not even discussed. As Ms Gifkins noted, this is problem is further
exacerbated by the wide discretion that the Council has in defining what exactly
constitutes ‘threats to international peace and security’ and how to respond to such
threats. She also asserted that even when the Council is able to find enough
consensus to authorise an intervention, if the consent of the state is not provided,
the Council is unlikely to take any effective action. Ms Gifkins also noted that the
subjective terms included in paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit Document act
as a further caveat to collective action by the Security Council.
In order to provide an example of these issues in an actual R2P case, Ms Gifkins
focused on the United Nations Security Council resolution 1706, which dealt with the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur. While there was broad acceptance that R2P crimes
were committed in Darfur, the resolution was drafted using the phrase ‘invites
consent of Sudanese government’. Ms Gifkins noted that this was clear case of a
situation whereby the lack of consent by the host government acted as a barrier to
the Council taking action in a crisis situation, even when an issue has been elevated
above ‘politics as normal’.
In her concluding remarks, Ms Gifkins noted that resolution 1706 was a key instance
of R2P as a ‘speech action’, where there was a deep gap between political
accountability and words. She also observed that it demonstrated a clear conceptual
confusion over the relationship between R2P and consent, which in theory can
include non-consensual intervention. However, she asserted that in order for this to
occur in practice, member states need to be willing to put forward their troops and
military capabilities.
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Averting Regime-Induced Displacement in the Asia-Pacific: Successes
and Failures
Phil Orchard
About the Presenter:
Dr Phil Orchard is a Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies in the School of Political
Science and International Studies at The University of Queensland. His primary
research interests include regime-induced displacement, and internally displaced
persons.
Abstract:
Regime-induced displacement, when governments deliberately displace their own
populations, is an issue not only for the Asia-Pacific region, but also for the wider
world. Such incidents not only lead to large scale flows of refugees and internally
displaced persons, but at the extreme blur into cases of ethnic cleansing and
genocide. Yet the international response remains ad hoc, discordant, and
problematic. This presentation examines four historical and contemporary cases of
regime induced displacement in the region, including East Pakistan (1971), East
Timor (1999), Burma/Myanmar (2000-2006), and Sri Lanka (2005-2009) in order to
understand the decision-making processes at the international and regional levels
which contributed to differing forms of international involvement ranging from
interventions and deployment of peacekeepers to limited or no response.
About the Presentation:
Dr. Orchard began his presentation by defining regime induced displacements as
being situations whereby governments deliberately use coercive tactics to cause
mass displacement within their own population. He then identified the three main
reasons why regime induced displacements are so problematic. Firstly, he noted that
it transcends the traditional divide between refugees and internally displaced
persons, whereby refugees receive protection under international law and internally
displaced persons do not. Second, Dr Orchard noted that victims of internal
displacement remain targets of their own government even after displacement, as is
evident in the case of Darfur. Finally, he asserted that it can blur the lines between
regime induced displacement, genocide, and ethnic cleansing, as all these tactics
may be used by governments to bring about displacement.
Following this, Dr Orchard noted that within the years 1991-2006 there were a
recorded 103 situations of mass displacement in 53 countries, which produced over
a hundred thousand refugees and internally displaced persons. He asserted that out
of this, 60 per cent were caused in whole or in part by regime induced displacement,
while the rest was mainly the result of civil war. However, Dr. Orchard emphasized
that it is important to keep in mind that governments often use civil war as a tactic
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to bring about mass displacement, and hence, there is no clear division between
regime induced displacement and civil war. With regards to mass displacement in
the Asia Pacific during this period, he noted that there were twenty major cases.
Four of these cases were large refugee flows, while the other sixteen cases were
large scale IDP flows.
Dr Orchard then argued that UN Security Council plays a vital role in preventing such
mass displacement. For instance, during the 1990s, there was a growing trend of
framing refugees and IDPs as Chapter VII issues, which deals with the responsibility
of the Security Council to take ‘action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches
of the peace, and acts of aggression’. According to Dr Orchard, the reason why mass
displacement was framed within these terms was due to the potential that it holds
to disrupt neighbouring states and regions, and thus, challenge international peace
and security. However, Dr Orchard argued that while the Security Council has
accepted this responsibility in rhetoric, as was seen with the signing of the
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, it has significantly failed to take direct action to
prevent regime induced displacement. In fact, Libya was the only case in which the
Security Council authorised intervention without the consent of the state to stop the
mass atrocities, violence and displacement that was being carried out by the regime.
For example, despite widespread evidence of mass atrocities being carried out in
East Pakistan in 1971, the UN Security Council refused to authorise any form of
intervention, by arguing that it was a domestic issue and thus, fell under the
sovereignty clause of the UN Charter.
In his concluding arguments, Dr Orchard noted that it is evident by the authorisation
of intervention in Libya that the Security Council has demonstrated greater
willingness to engage in humanitarian issues. However, it remains to be seen if this
will be a lasting trend.

Panel Five Question and Answer
Q1: The first question in this panel asked Dr Bartrop to respond to the claim that,
unlike his reading of history which he describes as being very non interventionist, the
1990s was highly interventionist.
In response, Dr Bartrop argued that while there have been more interventionist
resolutions passed since the end of the Second World War, there has also been a
greater upsurge of anti human behaviour since 1945. Hence, he asserted that there
is a great disconnection between these two trends, which makes it difficult to argue
that the has been wide intervention by the international community.

Legacies and Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities in the Asia-Pacific: A Workshop Report
46

Q2: Question two asked for a clarification on the role and prospects of non-invasive
strategies in genocide prevention.
In response, Dr. Bartrop asserted that for whatever options are suggested, there is
always going to be opposition due to concerns regarding national sovereignty.
Hence, even with regards to non-invasive strategies, he argued that what is vital is
political will by the international community.
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9. Roundtable
About the Roundtable:
The roundtable session offered workshop participants the opportunity to explore the
theme of “Genocide and Mass Atrocities in the Asia-Pacific: Legacies and Prevention”
as well as providing a forum for the participants to interact and put forward further
ideas. Workshop participants and guests were invited to consider and discuss a
range of critical questions concerning our region, including:








What are the ongoing legacies of mass atrocities in the Asia-Pacific region?
How do they impact upon the current and future stability of the region, and
on the lives of those who are affected?
What are the risks of future mass atrocities in the Asia-Pacific region?
What kinds of strategies can be utilised to mitigate those risks?
Are there particular opportunities or challenges within the region that might
influence these processes?
What is the best way forward in addressing the legacies of past atrocities in
the Asia-Pacific region?
What is the best way forward in approaching mass atrocity prevention in the
Asia-Pacific region?

The roundtable session concluded by asking participants to propose issues for future
consideration, and to propose recommendations that may contribute to preventing
future genocide and mass atrocities in the region.
Roundtable Discussion:
Associate Professor Fernandes began the open discussion on the workshop theme by
drawing attention to the role of civil society in early warning and the prevention of
genocide and mass atrocities. He offered the example of East Timor in 1975
compared to East Timor in 1999. Australian journalists were killed on Timor’s border
in 1975 but Associate Professor Fernandes suggested that, at that time, President
Suharto had not decided to invade Timor. To support this view he suggested that
President Suharto waited for five weeks after the incident to see what the
international reaction would be and only when he believed that there would be no
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patriots was a high priority for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).
Fenandes contrasted this account with Timor in 1999, when although the situation
within Timor was unstable, civilians arrived to witness the ballot and provide their
accounts to the rest of the world through the internet. This example illustrated the
capabilities of civil society and the international community to allow information
dissemination. Through micro-level organisation, early warning systems are created.
In support of Associate Professor Fernandes’ argument, Dr Phil Orchard shared with
the workshop participants his insight into the East Pakistan case. In this case
government control of the media was utilised to portray the situation as calm and
stable. The true situation was revealed when a journalist defected; reaching West
Pakistan and then the United Kingdom.
Dr Deborah Mayersen further explored the scope of civil society in genocide and
mass atrocity prevention, drawing the group’s attention to the existence of a
genocide prevention network which receives donations in preparation for the
possibility of genocide, rather than as a response. While pre-meditated actions have
been open to states in the past, civil societies are now able to prepare and respond
quickly to situations as they develop. Associate Professor Fernandes suggested that
oppressed groups benefited from solidarity with Western activist groups and
without this they will have lower chances for successful outcomes. Stephen
McLoughlin also supported the view that civil society can be an asset to genocide
prevention. He referred to Iran in the early 1980s to support this view. The regime
had planned to destroy the Baha’i by killing a maximum of twenty-thousand,
believing this would urge the remaining Baha’i population to convert to Islam. Early
into this plan it became apparent that it would not be successful. The global Baha’i
population conducted a spontaneous campaign which quickly became very well
organised. They lobbied governments and media to make sure the Iranian
government’s actions received global scrutiny. International Alert models their
operations on this campaign.
Professor Alex Hinton mentioned that the presentations at the workshop had a
strong state focus and more attention could be offered to international, global and
local perspectives. Dr Deborah Mayersen concurred with this point. Professor Hinton
continued that is was important to understand how these levels of analysis were
connected to provide a more accurate understanding of the issues in question as
there is a tendency amongst academics to collect diverse views under simplistic
categories.
Associate Professor Dale Bagshaw suggested that working at an individual level it
was important to engage with the reactions of young people to conflict. The ability
to analyse the dominant discourse was highlighted by Associate Professor Bagshaw
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as a life-long skill which children should be taught. The introduction of peer
mediation and conflict mediation skills to the mainstream curriculum was
recommended, particularly if it involved the community. Associate Professor
Bagshaw suggested that this approach would allow conflict prevention to occur at
the individual and communal levels. Annie Pohlman drew on her field work and
research to add that in situations where mass atrocities have occurred, individual
choices are the relevant issue in spite of outside pressures. Dr Mayersen suggested
education about common humanity as a long term genocide prevention measure
and reminded workshop participants that risk of genocide can be a long term issue.
Associate Professor Ben Goldsmith drew attention to the case of Yugoslavia where
there was intermarriage and low levels of fractured nationalism but violence
occurred despite these indications of inter-ethnic tolerance. Conversely, in the
United States there is evidence of religious intolerance yet no mass atrocities.
Associate Professor Goldsmith recommended analysing the institutions and ties
which contribute to these factors, including in the context of civil society, to provide
an understanding of the factors which contribute to the prevention of genocide. Also
considered valuable is further investigation of how civil society functions effectively
to prevent genocide and how it fails.
Associate Professor Bagshaw recognised that the workshop had not included the
opportunity to talk about the contributions of women as peacemakers, which in
some cases have been very successful. An example offered by Dr Mayersen was the
local level conflict mediation training offered by Oxfam to women in Sri Lanka.
When the workshop participants were asked what could prevent genocide, there
were a variety of responses. Associate Professor Bagshaw suggested increased
education about genocide and more activists working to prevent it. Large armies
were mentioned as a factor which might promote genocide by Annie Pohlman.
Professor Hinton added that many of these indicators are currently appearing. He
urged further engagement with these issues and suggested Libya and Burma as good
candidates for this consideration.
Associate Professor Goldsmith suggested increased education, democratisation,
development and higher GDP per capita could be beneficial. Dr Mayersen
questioned whether it was economic growth or economic resilience which was most
valuable. Rwanda illustrates this point as it experienced high levels of economic
growth but did not have strong economic resilience and, when the country
experienced an economic crisis, genocide occurred. Dr Mayersen recommended
further unpacking the connection between economic variables and genocide.
Professor Hinton was concerned about adopting democracy as a prevention strategy
as it is relies on liberal democratic teleology; he cautioned the workshop participants
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to be aware of this as a Western-centric perspective.
Associate Professor Goldsmith argued that while these ideas of democracy may have
Western roots, they are not exclusively Western. Taiwan and South Korea have both
experienced effective democracy. These ideas seem to be able to function in many
societies. Their effect has been visible in Associate Professor Goldsmith’s data
analysis. Another feature that Associate Professor Goldsmith considers important although it did not appear in his model - is the ethnic division and the treatment of
minorities which allow mass atrocities to take place. Discrimination does not have to
have a legal basis to become an accepted norm. Rwanda and Indonesia were
mentioned as examples of situations of discrimination.
Ms Pohlman noted that in Indonesia, one of the main factors that has contributed to
the outbreak of mass atrocities has been the lack of strong and accountable
institutions. As a result, even when there are strict laws preventing certain actions,
there is a lack of effective institutions to enforce them. Dr Mayersen noted that legal
discrimination is another main factor that has contributed to the risk of mass
atrocities in numerous cases. Mr Tay asserted that ethnic discrimination may also
lead to the outbreak of mass atrocities. In support of this argument, he provided the
example of Malaysia, where the majority ethnic group, the Bumaputra, are given
special privileges by the government. He stated that such practices have become so
institutionalised that they are seldom even questioned by the general population.
This highlights the importance of raising awareness within the local community
about the nature and dangers of such injustices. In emphasizing the importance of
this, Mr Tay compared the cases of Germany and Japan. He noted that in Germany,
efforts undertaken by the government and other groups within the country to raise
awareness about the Holocaust has resulted in a high level of shame among the
German population. In contrast, the Japanese government has removed evidence of
wartime atrocities committed by the Japanese army. As such, the Japanese
population are generally unaware that such atrocities were ever committed.
Associate Professor Dale Bagshaw asserted that there is a general unawareness even
among the Australian population about the mass atrocities that were committed
against the indigenous population. Dr Mayersen voiced that the Australian
population is generally ambivalent to genocide awareness and prevention, even in
the broad community, with most schools only focusing on the Holocaust as part of
genocide studies. Mr McLoughlin highlighted the dangers in this, as past atrocities
are a high risk factor in future atrocities, with genocide denial being a major
contributing factor for genocide. However, Professor Alex Hinton questioned the
validity of the argument that the institutionalisation of racism is a contributing factor
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for the outbreak of mass atrocities and genocide; as such practices are present even
in stable democratic countries such as the United States.
The discussion then proceeded to the international community’s involvement in
Libya. Dr Mayersen questioned whether the international community was willing to
intervene due to a progression of mass atrocities, or whether it was merely
undertaken due to Libya’s pariah status among the international community.
Associate Professor Goldsmith asserted that this was a very complex issue with
various contending views. One view is that the international community was so
willing to intervene in order to deter other leaders from carrying out such mass
atrocities. Dr Luke Glanville voiced that the West became may have become
involved in Libya due to the widespread media attention that was devoted to the
rebels’ cause. In this sense, the international community was forced to intervene.
Dr Mayersen then questioned the criteria for distinguishing rebels as military
combatants from civilians in need of protection. In response, Mr Tay noted that from
a legal perspective, there is not much distinction between lawful and unlawful
combatants. Dr Mayersen suggested that this distinction becomes more important
with regards to how rebels are portrayed by the government and the international
media. For example, in Sri Lanka, the government was very effective in portraying
the Tamil Tigers as militants, which deterred international intervention. In contrast,
the international media was successful in portraying the rebels in Libya as civilians,
which has made it easier for the international community to intervene on the basis
of humanitarian considerations. Mr McLoughlin asserted that also highlights the
dangers of perceiving R2P as a speech act as opposed to a policy agenda, as it implies
distinctions that are not always present.
Dr Mayersen then steered the discussion towards answering the question whether
the intervention in Libya has reduced the risks of future mass atrocities, or whether
it may prove irrelevant or even negative within the context of future intervention in
situations of mass atrocities. Associate Professor Goldsmith contended that from a
broad view of international relations, the decision by the UN Security Council to
intervene and the reluctance of the US to lead the intervention, despite committing
troops for the mission, suggests a major change. In terms of practical international
relations, he asserted that the intervention in Libya sends clear deterrence signals
and offers potential that the US will get involved in the future at an earlier stage.
However, Ms Gidley opposed this argument, by asserting that the reason why the
international community was so willing to intervene was merely due to the scale of
violence. She therefore argued that it was unlikely that the UN Security Council
would get involved in future cases of mass atrocities if the same scale of violence is
not present.
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10. Recommendations
There was broad agreement that the issue of genocide and mass atrocity prevention
in the Asia-Pacific region is extremely complex.
Nevertheless, there are
opportunities for governments, civil society organisations and centres such as the
Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect to promote actions that can
reduce the risk of future mass atrocities in the region. Reflecting on the roundtable
discussion, the panel presentations and the panel discussions, and the theme of the
workshop, participants agreed on the following recommendations:











Education programs in the Asia-Pacific region should be targeted at informing
high school students, university students and the community about mass
atrocities. They should also be used to encourage tolerance and create an
understanding of a common humanity.
Skills related to conflict prevention should be in the central curriculum for
school students. These include peer-mediation and critical examination of
sources.
Civil society frameworks must be supported so that they can provide a means
with which individuals can engage with issues associated with mass atrocity
prevention.
At the state level, structural prevention measures must be pursued.
Fair and equal justice must be provided to prevent injustices escalating into
violence or severe discrimination. Human rights violations must be answered
by a legal framework capable of defending rights.
It is critical for international community to assist states in preventing mass
atrocities and if this fails they must be prepared to intercede to defend the
lives of civilians.

Participants reflected that it was particularly valuable to bring an Asia-Pacific focus
to the issue of genocide and mass atrocities. There was a unique legacy of mass
atrocities in our region, and very specific issues concerning transitional justice and
reconciliation. The region also faces unique challenges in preventing genocide and
mass atrocities in the future. It was hoped that there might be future opportunities
to bring a regional focus to the issue following on from this workshop.
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11. Appendix I: Workshop Programme

Monday 21 March 2011
8.45-9.15am

Workshop Opening, Acknowledgement of Country

9.15-10.30am

Panel One: Mass Violence in Indonesia and East Timor
Chair: Dr Paul Bartrop
East Timor: The Politics of Starvation
Associate Professor Clinton Fernandes, UNSW@ADFA
An Ongoing Legacy of Atrocity: Torture and the Indonesian State
Annie Pohlman, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

10.30am – 11am

Morning Tea

11am – 12.30pm
Panel Two: Opportunities and Challenges for Mass Atrocity Prevention
in the Asia-Pacific
Chair: Associate Professor Ben Goldsmith
Mediation in the Asia-Pacific: Constraints and Challenges
Associate Professor Dale Bagshaw, University of South Australia
The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)
and Mass Atrocity Prevention in Southeast Asia
Catherine Drummond, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to
Protect
The Role of Stable Small States in the Responsibility to Protect
Charles Tay, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
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12.30pm – 1.30pm

1.30pm- 3pm

Lunch

Panel Three: Transitional Justice after Mass Atrocities
Chair: Professor Alex Hinton
Political Manipulation at the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia
Rebecca Gidley, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to
Protect
‘Maximising’ Transitional Justice Opportunities: The Case of East
Timor’s CAVR
Dr. Heather Castel, School of History, Philosophy, Religion and
Classics, The University of Queensland

3.15pm

Exhibition Launch and Afternoon Tea
Lessons from Rwanda: The United Nations and the Prevention of
Genocide
United Nations Department of Public Information (UNDPI)

4pm-5.30pm Public Lecture
The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A View from Critical Transitional Justice
Studies,
Professor Alex Hinton, Director, Center for Genocide, Conflict
Resolution and Human Rights, Rutgers University
6.30pm

Conference Dinner
‘A Night in India’
58 High St, Toowong
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Tuesday 22 March 2011
9am-10.30am

Panel Four: Early Warning and Prevention of Genocide and Mass
Atrocities
Chair: Associate Professor Dale Bagshaw
Political Instability and Large-Scale Violence in the Economic North and
South: Is the process different for richer and poorer societies?
Dr Benjamin Goldsmith, University of Sydney
Professor Arcot Sowmya, Dimitri Semenovich, University of NSW
Understanding the Relationship between Risk and Resilience in the Long
Term Prevention of Mass Atrocities: An Examination of Botswana and
Zambia
Stephen McLoughlin, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Why Not Genocide? Exploring Constraints that Inhibit Genocide Onset in
at-risk Societies
Dr Deborah Mayersen, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

10.30am-11am Morning Tea

11am-12.30pm Panel Five: The United Nations, Sovereignty and International Intervention
in Mass Atrocity Crimes
Chair: Associate Professor Clinton Fernandes
Political Realism, Sovereignty and Intervention: Is Genocide Prevention
Really Possible in a World of Sovereign States
Dr Paul Bartrop, Bialik College
The UN Security Council and Mass Atrocity Prevention: ‘Timely and
Decisive’ Responses?
Jess Gifkins, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Averting Regime-Induced Displacement in the Asia-Pacific: Successes and
Failures
Dr Phil Orchard, School of Political Science and International Studies, UQ
The University of Queensland

12.30pm-1.30pm

Lunch
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1.30pm-2.45pm

2.45pm-3.15pm

Roundtable: Mass Atrocities in the Asia-Pacific: Legacies and
Prevention
Co-facilitators: TBC
In this roundtable, participants will be invited to consider a range of
key questions concerning the legacies of mass atrocities in the AsiaPacific, and prospects for future prevention.
Afternoon tea and Close of Workshop
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The Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect is an Associate of the Global
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. The Centre’s mission is to advance the
Responsibility to Protect principle within the Asia-Pacific Region and worldwide, and
support the building of capacity to protect populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
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